Author Archives: V. Ramanan

Anthony Thirlwall’s Predictions About The Fate Of The Euro Area From The Year 2000

Kaldorians have been stressing how the Euro project is a half-baked idea. Nicholas Kaldor himself predicted in 1971 that the Euro Area without a federal government would be a failure and warned the establishment.

Anthony Thirlwall—the literary executor of Kaldor—also had his great predictions.

In an article, The Euro And Regional Divergence In Europe, in the book, The Eurosceptical Reader 2, in the year 2000 even predicted the rise of dark forces and the alt-right!

Some quotes:

Page 33:

The regional disaffection that will be caused by deteriorating economic circumstances in countries that lack the policy instruments to deal with economic crisis can too easily become the breeding ground for nationalism and fascism, and political resentment, as witnessed in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. By all means, let there be more coordination of economic policies in Europe and let the countries of Europe strive for greater political cooperation in areas such as defence, human rights and relations with other countries, but not by luring them into an economic straitjacket over which there is no democratic control and from which there is no easy escape. This is a recipe for political turmoil and the fragmentation of Europe that Britain would be wise to steer clear of.

[italics: mine]

Page 28:

… paradoxically, the euro could become a threat to European integration and stability if it exacerbates regional differences within the EU which I believe it is likely to do. Shocks to countries and to regions within countries are rarely symmetric. Without the instruments to cope, asymmetric shocks will exacerbate regional differences, with the prospect of civil strife, political unrest and disaffection with the whole EU project in the affected regions. Regional policies in the EU are a poor substitute for the ability of individual countries to cope with shocks in their own way.

Page 30:

Loss of economic sovereignty

Adoption of the euro means the abandonment of all the traditional weapons of economic policy that in the past have served countries reasonably well. It is hard to imagine how the countries of Europe would have fared in the post-war years without the active use of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy. Relinquishing these instruments of policy could spell disaster for individual countries in the future.

Page 32:

Nowhere in the pacts and conditions governing Economic and Monetary Union and the single currency are there any safeguards against deflationary policies and deflationary conditions such as rising unemployment, falling prices or even governments running budget surpluses. The ‘rules of the game’ are asymmetrical, biased against inflation, as indeed they are at the international level whereby the International Monetary Fund penalises countries in balance of payments deficit, but not those in surplus, which therefore imparts deflationary bias in the world economy.

Page 49:

It would be churlish to wish the euro ill, but I fear that it is going to do great damage to the economies of Europe and to the noble objective of greater European harmony and cooperation. Economic and social disparities between the countries and regions of Europe are still vast, and there is nothing in the euro itself which is going to eliminate these disparities. If anything, without an effective regional policy and fiscal transfer mechanisms, they are likely to widen, making the task of political integration – if that is the ultimate aim of the euro – that much more difficult. The United Kingdom government would do well to steer clear of this risky venture for more than the lifetime of even the next Parliament.

[italics: mine]

Anthony Thirlwall. Picture credit: Wikipedia

Link

Anthony Thirlwall: A Life In Economics

PSL Quarterly Review has a new series Recollections Of Eminent Economists and Anthony Thirlwall has the inaugural contribution.

Abstract:

The paper is the first inaugural contribution to the new series of “Recollections of Eminent Economists”. Under this name, the previous series of the journal (then called “Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review”) used to publish autobiographic essays in which renowned economists described their scientific path and reflected on the recent developments of the discipline. In this work, A.P. Thirlwall recalls his personal and academic biography, ranging from employment in the UK to consultancy work in developing countries, and comments on the reception of his main works. Among the latter, special attention is paid to regional and development economics, as well as to the relation between the balance of payments and economic growth. Throughout the discussion, the author emphasizes the Keynesian inspiration of his analyses.

[the title is the link]

New Book: Vol II Of Michał Kalecki’s Intellectual Biography By Jan Toporowski

The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was published in January, 1936.

Meanwhile, … , Michal Kalecki had found the same solution.

His book, Essays in the Theory of Business Cycles, published in Polish in 1933, clearly states the principle of effective demand in mathematical form. At the same time he was already exploring the implications of the analysis for the problem of a country’s balance of trade, along the same lines that I followed in drawing riders from the General Theory in essays published in 1937.

The version of his theory set out in prose (published in ‘Polska Gospodarcza’ No. 43, X, 1935) could very well be used today as an introduction to the theory of employment.

He opens by attacking the orthodox theory at the most vital point – the view that unemployment could be reduced  by cutting money wage rates. And he shows (a point that Keynesians came to much later, and under his influence) that , of monopolistic influences prevent prices from falling when wage costs are lowered, the situation is still worse, because reduced purchasing power causes a fall in sales on consumption goods …

Michal Kalecki’s claim to priority of publication is indisputable.

– Joan Robinson, Kalecki And Keynes in Essays In Honour Of Michal Kalecki, 1964. 

Jan Toporowski’s intellectual biography, volume 2 of Michał Kalecki is out now.

click to view on Google Books

Volume I was released in 2013.

click to view on Google Books

Legacy: Ajit Singh

Ashwani Saith has a fine biography of Ajit Singh for Ajit Singh (1940–2015), The Radical Cambridge Economist: Anti‐Imperialist Advocate Of Third World Industrialization for the latest issue of Development And Change.

The article highlights how his worldview and work was quite close to Nicky Kaldor.

Ajit Singh died on 23 June 2015 and there’s also a fine obituary on him in The Guardian by John Eatwell.

F.M. Scherer had a nice biography in the Palgrave Companion To Cambridge Economics.

Graham Gudgin Interview On Brexit

There’s a nice recent interview—earlier this month—of Graham Gudgin of Cambridge University with Labour Leave on Brexit.

click to view on YouTube

Gudgin says he voted to leave the EU. He says the top reason to leave is that the UK would have never gotten another chance to leave in our lifetimes.

He also talks about his new website Briefings For Brexit, set up exclusively for this issue.

You can follow them on Twitter too.

Paul Krugman’s Shifting Views On International Trade And Globalisation

Recently Paul Krugman wrote up an articleGlobalization: What Did We Miss? for the IMF globalisation conference last fall. The paper is a large concession to the points some economists have been making on international trade and globalisation. Krugman concedes that:

soaring imports did impose a significant shock on some U.S. workers, which may have helped cause the globalization backlash.

He also draws this chart, coming to the view that the US trade has led to a weakness of manufacturing.

The New Consensus narrative is that loss of employment is due to productivity rises and not due to international trade. Now Krugman has accepted the view that it is the latter.

Further, he also says:

Until the late 1990s employment in manufacturing, although steadily falling as a share of total employment, had remained more or less flat in absolute terms. But manufacturing employment fell off a cliff after 1997, and this decline corresponded to a sharp increase in the nonoil deficit, of around 2.5 percent of GDP.

Does the surge in the trade deficit explain the fall in employment? Yes, to a significant extent. A trade deficit doesn’t produce a one-for-one decline in manufacturing value added, since a significant share of both exports and imports of goods include embodied services. But a reasonable estimate is that the deficit surge reduced the share of manufacturing in GDP by around 1.5 percentage points, or more than 10 percent, which means that it explains more than half of the roughly 20 percent decline in manufacturing employment between 1997 and 2005.

Again, this is over a relatively short time period and focuses on absolute employment, not the employment share. Trade deficits explain only a small part of the long-term shift toward a service economy. But soaring imports did impose a significant shock on some U.S. workers, which may have helped cause the globalization backlash.

And trade deficits are, as I said, part of a broader story of adjustment issues.

Manufacturing is important partly because of increasing returns to scale and partly because it’s easier to export manufactures, although services are catching up.

Further, he quotes the work of Autor, et. al.:

This is where the now-famous analysis of the “China shock” by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) comes in. What ADH mainly did was to shift focus from broad questions of income distribution to the effects of rapid import growth on local labor markets, showing that these effects were large and persistent. This represented a new and important insight.

To make partial excuses for those of us who failed to consider these issues 25 years ago, at the time we had no way of knowing that either the hyperglobalization shown in Figure 1 or the trade deficit surge shown in Figure 2 were going to happen. And without the combination of these developments the “China shock” would have been much smaller. Still, we missed an important part of the story.

But concessions of previous held orthodox views are hardly straightforward. Despite this large concession, Krugman still wants to defend free trade and is against any tariffs. One may critique selective protectionism but there is also the option of imposing tariffs non-discriminately, i.e., non-selective protectionism.

More importantly, as Joan Robinson often stressed the thesis of free trade ought to also come with the answer to the question: what is the mechanism for resolving imbalances? Free traders always avoid this question, sometimes claiming—as Milton Friedman did—that floating exchange rates does the trick. But we know that it’s hardly the case. In the absence of any market mechanism, we need an official mechanism.

The IMF On The Endogeneity Of The Natural Rate Of Growth

At their blog, in an article titled The Economic Scars of Crises and Recessions, the IMF is now conceding that demand affects supply and that all types of recessions lead to a permanent damage to the supply side. This is known in Post-Keynesian literature as the endogeneity of the natural rate of growth.

Earlier it was thought by them that these are temporary and the economy recovers to its pre-recession trend.

In a 2016 article for the INET, Marc Lavoie had argued how these ideas were new to the mainstream but well known in the heterodox literature.

These are not special to just recessions, as the IMF authors seem to be arguing but is happening continuously, even outside recession. The 2002 paper The Endogeneity Of The Natural Rate Of Growth by Miguel A. León‐Ledesma and A. P. Thirlwall for the Cambridge Journal Of Economics is a great reference.

If there’s full employment, the rate of growth of GDP is equal to the rate of growth of the labour force plus the rate of growth of productivity. This is Harrod’s natural rate of growth. Unlike the natural rate of interest or of unemployment, this is not vacuous. Of course, below full employment, an economy can grow faster, although the actual rate of growth depends on demand always. We also know that the rate of growth of productivity depends itself on the rate of growth of the GDP. So that implies that the natural rate of growth is endogenous.

From the León‐Ledesma-Thirlwall paper:

The question of whether the natural growth rate is exogenous or endogenous to demand, and whether it is input growth that causes output growth or vice versa, lies at the heart of the debate between neoclassical growth economists on the one hand, who treat the rate of growth of the labour force and labour productivity as exogenous to the actual rate of growth, and economists in the Keynesian/post-Keynesian tradition, who maintain that growth is primarily demand driven because labour force growth and productivity growth respond to demand growth, both foreign and domestic. The latter view does not imply, of course, that demand growth determines supply growth without limit; rather, that aggregate demand determines aggregate supply over a range of full employment growth rates, and that in most countries demand constraints (related to excessive inflation and balance of payments disequilibrium) tend to bite long before supply constraints are ever reached.

Ashoka Mody On The Euro Tragedy

Ashoka Mody has a fine article The Euro Area’s Deepening Political Divide on VoxEU on how recent national elections in Germany and Italy suggest that people of Europe are drifting apart.

He also gives a historical context to what voters think. For example, he says:

And in September 1992, the French public came within a whisker of rejecting the single currency.

The voting pattern in the French referendum eerily foreshadowed recent political protests. Those who voted against the single currency tended to have low incomes and limited education, they lived in areas that were turning into industrial wastelands, they worked in insecure jobs, and, for all these reasons, they were deeply worried about the future (Mody 2018: 101–103). By voting against the Maastricht Treaty, they were not necessarily expressing an anti-European sentiment; rather, they were demanding that French policymakers pay more attention to domestic problems, which European institutions and policies could not solve.

He also has a new bookEurotragedy – A Drama In Nine Acts, soon.

In his article, Mody also refers to Kaldor’s prescience from his article The Dynamic Effects Of The Common Market first published in the New Statesman, 12 March 1971 and also reprinted (as Chapter 12, pp 187-220) in Further Essays On Applied Economics – volume 6 of the Collected Economic Essays series of Nicholas Kaldor. You can read some quotes from this article here.

Louis-Philippe Rochon On Basil Moore And The Supply Of Credit

Basil Moore passed away recently, as I mentioned a few days back in this blog.

One of the criticisms of Moore’s work was the passive role of banks. Louis-Philippe Rochon has an excellent article in his Festschrift Complexity, Endogenous Money and Macroeconomic Theory — Essays in Honour Of Basil J. Moore, Edward Elgar, 2006, to further develop Moore’s views.

Below is the scan of the full article, provided to me by LP for posting here.

The object below is an embed of the pdf. If the embed doesn’t display, or to get a better view, you can open it in a separate browser tab here.



A Comment On Wynne Godley And Non-selective Protectionism On The Article XII Of The GATT

Nick Edmonds commented on my post Wynne Godley And Non-Selective Protectionism—which documented all the references where Wynne Godley proposes the usage of the Article XII of the GATT—pointing out that the Article XII of the GATT can only be invoked reserve assets are under threat.

Hence it is difficult for the United States to invoke it. I agree with this. It’s looks more designed for nations who accumulate reserve assets and for whom sales of reserve assets is an important way to finance current account deficits. The U.S. has some reserve assets but is under no imminent threat. (And it finances its current account deficit mainly by net incurrence of liabilities instead of sale of reserve assets).

The WTO page Technical Information on Balance of Payments has this information:

Introduction

Under the rules of the WTO, any trade restriction taken by a Member must be consistent, or in compliance, with the rules of the international trading system. Under the provisions of Article XII, XVIII:B and the “Understanding of the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994”, a Member may apply import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons.

GATT: Articles XII and XVIII:B

Article XII and XVIII:B in their current form were redrafted in 1957 by the Working Party on Quantitative Restrictions. At that time, balance-of-payments measures referred to quantitative restrictions and were an exception to Article XI which prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions. Article XII can be invoked by all Members and Article XVIII:B by the developing country Members (defined as those in the early stages of development and with a low standard of living.

The basic condition for invoking Article XII is to “safeguard the [Member’s] external financial position and its balance-of-payments”; Article XVIII:B mentions the need to “safeguard the [Member’s] external financial position and ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development”. Both Articles refer to the need to “restore equilibrium on a sound and lasting basis”. While Article XII mentions the objective of “avoiding the uneconomic employment of resources”, Article XVIII:B refers to “assuring an economic employment of production resources”.

Article XVIII:B contains somewhat less stringent criteria than Article XII. Article XII (para. 2)states that import restrictions “shall not exceed those necessary (i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves” or (ii) “…in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves”.

Article XVIII:B (para. 9) omits the word “imminent” from the first condition and refers to an “inadequate” level rather than a “very low” level of reserves; “adequate” is defined as “adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development”.

Both Articles require Members to progressively relax the restrictions as conditions improve and eliminate them when conditions no longer justify such maintenance.

The 1979 Declaration

After the Tokyo Round, the 1979 Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payments Purposes (BISD 26S/205) extended the disciplines to all trade measures imposed for balance-of-payments reasons, not just quantitative restrictions. Thus all trade measures taken for balance-of-payments purposes come within the purview of notification and consultation requirements.

The 1979 Declaration introduced three new conditions for the application of balance-of-payments measures: (i) that preference shall be given to the measure which has “the least disruptive effect on trade” while abiding by disciplines provided for in the GATT; (ii) that the simultaneous application of more than one trade measure for balance-of-payments purposes shall be avoided; and (iii) that “whenever practicable, contracting parties shall publicly announce a time schedule for the removal of the measures”. It also spelled out that measures should not be taken “for the purpose of protecting a particular industry or sector”.

I am sure Wynne was aware of this, so it’s curious why he mentions it over the years. If anyone knows, I’ll be grateful!