Monthly Archives: January 2012

S&P Takes Rating Actions On Euro Area Governments

On 5 December 2011, S&P put ratings of EA17 governments on rating watch negative. See my post S&P And EA17 National Governments for link to the S&P report. Today it concluded its review and downgraded several governments.

click to view  the tweet on Twitter

According to the report, which can be obtained from S&P’s Tweet:

We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013. The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.

We assigned recovery ratings of `4′ to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should a default occur in the future.

S&P also cites that “an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges” as one of the reasons to take the rating actions.

How can the Euro Area solve its problems?

One of my favourite papers is A Simple Model Of Three Economies With Two Currencies (link) written by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie. The paper was written about 7-8 years back and was published in 2006 in the Cambridge Journal of Economics.

The paper’s abstract:

This paper presents a Keynesian model which describes three countries trading merchandise and financial assets with one another. It is initially assumed that all three countries have independent fiscal policies but that two of the countries share a currency, hence the model can be used to make a preliminary analysis of the conduct of economic policy in ‘the eurozone’ vis-a`-vis the rest of the world—‘the USA’. The main conclusion will be that, if all three countries do indeed operate independent fiscal policies, the system will work under a floating currency regime, but only so long as the European central bank is prepared to modify the structure of its assets by accumulating an ever rising proportion of bills issued by any ‘weak’ euro country.

G&L make an interesting remark about a possible ECB behaviour:

… If the ECB is forbidden from accommodating market-driven changes in the composition of its assets, or if the ECB rules that it will not accumulate additional stocks of securities issued by governments that have excessively large debts according to rating agencies, then fiscal policy in the ‘weak’ countries must be endogenous for stability to prevail, for otherwise it would seem that the only alternative is to let interest rates on euro bills to diverge from country to country in an unsustainable way.

Now this would seem to be a rather dismal state of affairs, from a progressive standpoint. However, it should be noted that balanced fiscal and external positions for all could as well be reached if the euro country benefiting from a (quasi) twin surplus as a result of the negative external shock on the other euro country decided to increase its government expenditures, in an effort to get rid of its budget surplus …

i.e., Euro Area nations with a weak external sector will have to deflate fiscal policy to attempt to keep the external deficit, net indebtedness to the rest of the world and interest rate in check, if surplus nations in the Euro Area do not wish to engage in fiscal expansion. Else, as G&L conclude:

Alternatively, the present structure of the European Union would need to be modified, giving far more spending and taxing power to the European Union Parliament, transforming it into a bona fide federal government that would be able to engage into substantial equalisation payments which would automatically transfer fiscal resources from the more successful to the less successful members of the euro zone. In this manner, the eurozone would be provided with a mechanism that would reduce the present bias towards downward fiscal adjustments of the deficit countries.

In my opinion, this is the only way the Euro Area can come out of the mess because it is the only way the net indebtedness of an EA nation (or a group of nations) can be prevented from exploding relative to its domestic output .

For an earlier take on the Maastricht Treaty by Wynne Godley see the article Maastricht And All That published in the London Review of Books in 1992.

More From Nicholas Kaldor

In a recent post, I quoted Kaldor and got a lot of response on what I quoted. So a post on more from the book The Scourge Of Monetarism from the early 80s.

In the following PSBR is Public Sector Borrowing Requirement – the term used often in the UK for net market borrowing of the UK Treasury for a given period such as a month/quarter/year.

The following appears in the Part II of the book. The Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Treasury and the Civil Service ordered an enquiry into monetary policy and Kaldor was invited to write on this in 1980. The whole text appears in the book and the following appears on pages 48-50:

In the Green Paper on Monetary Control of March 1980 it is asserted that ‘it is sometimes helpful to examine how a particular control will affect items on the asset side of the banking system’. The Paper then proceeds to state an accounting identity which shows the change in the money stock (£M3) in a given period as the sum of five separately identified items, of which PSBR is one (though it is not claimed that the five items are mutually invariant).

In my view it may be more helpful to view the effects of the PSBR on the asset side of the non-banking private sector, both at home and overseas. The PSBR in any year can be defined as the public sector’s net de-cumulation of financial assets (net dissaving) which by accounting identity must be equal to the net acquisition of financial assets (net saving) of the private sector, home and overseas; which in turn can be broken down to the net acquisition of financial assets of the personal sector, of the company sector, and the overseas sector (the latter is the negative of the balance of payments on current account). Ignoring capital flows of existing wealth to and from the country, the change in liabilities of the banking system is thus equal to that part of the net saving (or the net increment of financial assets) of the home and overseas private sector which persons and companies wish to hold in the form of sterling bank deposits as against other financial assets (such as ‘bonds’ or ‘gilts’) and which in turn is equal to that part of the PSBR which is financed by the addition of the banking system’s holding of the public sector debt.

The main monetarist thesis is that the net dissaving of the public sector is ‘inflationary’ in so far as it is ‘financed’ by the banking system and not by the sale of debt (bonds or gilts) to the public. But this view ignores the fact that the net saving, or net acquisition of financial assets of the private sector will be the same irrespective of whether it is held in the form of bank deposits or of bonds. The part of the current borrowing of the public sector which is directly financed by net purchases of public debt by the banking system – and which has its counterpart in a corresponding increase in bank deposits held by the non-banking private sector – is as much part of the net saving of the private sector as the part which is financed by the sale of gilts to the private sector. When the public sector’s de-cumulation of financial assets increases (i.e. the PSBR increases) there must be an equivalent increase in the net savings of the non-bank private sector (home and overseas) as compared with what net savings would have been with an unchanged PSBR which will be the same irrespective of how much that saving takes the form of purchases of gilts and how much takes the form of an increase in deposits with the banking system. The decision of how much of the increment in private wealth is held in one form or another is a portfolio decision depending on relative yields, the expectation of future changes in interest rates (long and short), and the premium which the owners are willing to pay for ‘liquidity’ – i.e. the possession of command over resources in a form that can be directly applied to extinguish debts or to meet financial commitments.

But it is a mistake to think that an individual’s spending plans (whether in a business or in a personal capacity) are significantly affected by the decision of how much of his wealth he decides to keep in the form of ‘money’ (broadly or narrowly defined) as against other financial assets that are readily convertible into money (including available overdraft facilities). It is equally mistaken (in my view) to assume that the part of current private saving which is held in the form of additional bank deposits gives rise to additional lending by the banks to the private sector, whereas the part which is held in the form of bonds does not. In the former case, the increase in the bank’s liabilities to depositors is matched by a corresponding increase in the banks’ holding of public sector debt.

The Transactions Flow Matrix

Why is GDP defined as C+I+G+… and how is it related to national income, expenditure etc and that of each sector of an economy such as that of households?

The following table (redrawn by myself) taken from the book Monetary Economics by Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie gives an idea on how to go about measuring national income, product etc. The sample chapter (Contents, Chapter 1 & Index) from the publisher’s website has an introduction to the authors’ approach of studying Macroeconomics from a stock-flow consistent approach.

The table describes income and expenditures flows within an economy. Of course, as mentioned this is simplified and complications have to be added one by one. For example, there is no inventories, no external sector and households do not purchase a house etc. However, the above construction shows an easy way of building up and thinking about how funds flow between different ‘sectors’ of an economy. The reader who is new to this way of thinking should pay attention to the signs attached to each entry. For example, households receive wages and it is a source of funds for them and hence the positive sign. When they are consuming, they use funds and hence the first row in the table with the item consumption has a negative sign for households. For businesses, this a source of funds and hence positive. Another item which may be unfamiliar is the capital account of businesses. Firms purchase capital goods for their production and the sale of these goods comes from the same sector and hence one need for this column.

Even at this simplified form, there are a lot which are not known from the above table. What form does saving take? How does the government finance its excess of expenditure over income (i.e., deficit)? How do firms pay for wages and get funds to do the investment etc. To see this, we need a transactions flow matrix which I had discussed previously in my post Financial Crisis And Flow Of Funds from a not-so-pedagogic perspective. It is a foxy trick.

A few things before going into this. First notice that from the matrix,

C + I + G = Y = WB + F

So in our simplified example, gross domestic product is the sum of expenditures on goods and services and at the same time the sum of incomes paid for the production of goods and services.

Second, if you want the actual numbers (for the United States), the place to get this from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1. In particular, tables F.6 and F.7 and the hyperlink directly takes you to the table.

Back to our question on what form does saving take and how do firms finance their activities etc. Below is the table I made using TeX (and taken from the same book, Chapter 1)

The questions asked also lead us naturally to the introduction of the banking sector and its importance in the process of production, and this sector was missing in Table 1. So we can now clearly see what form saving takes. For households, this is in the form of currency notes, bank deposits, government T-bills and firms’ equities. Apart from various complications added, you may have noticed that profits are assumed to be part distributed and part retained. Firms hence finance investment by retained earnings, loans from banks and by issuance of equities, here. The government finances its deficit (i.e., excess of outlays over receipts) by issuing currency notes and T-bills. We have merged the Central Bank and the Federal Government into one sector “Govt”, for simplicity (which is also the case for Table 1). The behavioural aspects are something different and it should not be assumed that the government can “control” its deficit and that it can choose the proportion of financing in the form of currency notes and bills.

Needless to say, the above transactions flow matrix is a simplified one. For example, you may immediately notice that there is no interest payments on loans and bills yet.

It should be noted here that the entries in the table are flows and hence you may see a lot of Δs. The reader who is relatively new to this should not fail to observe the signs attaching each entry. The negative sign in the entry for deposits for households may be confusing at first, but the self-consistency of the whole construction forces the signs on these entries.

It is worth emphasizing that the fact that all rows and columns sum to zero and this makes the whole construction very appealing. When I was trying to get myself introduced to economics about 3 years back, I browsed around the internet and quickly came across the transactions flow matrix – exactly what I was looking for!

This construction greatly simplifies visualizing flow of funds as compared to the Blue Book way of doing it. The following is the 2008 SNA way of maintaining national accounts and there is some additional effort one needs to visualize this without the usage of a transactions flow matrix!

(click to enlarge)

Books In Honour Of Wynne Godley

There are two new books in honour of Wynne Godley and they are out now

The first one – edited by Marc Lavoie and Gennaro Zezza – has selected articles and papers by Wynne Godley, and carefully chosen.

It’s available at amazon.co.uk, but not yet on amazon.com

Here’s the book’s website on Palgrave Macmillan. The book also contains the full bibliography of Godley’s papers, books, working papers, memoranda (such as to the UK expenditure committee), magazine/newspaper articles, letters to the editor etc.

Here’s a picture I took of Marc at Levy Institute in May when he was deciding on the cover.

The is second book written in honour of Wynne Godley contains proceeding of the conference held in May at the Levy Institute (the same place the above photograph was taken)

The publisher’s website for the book is here.

Dimitri says:

The death of Wynne Godley silences a forceful and very often critical voice in macroeconomics. Wynne’s own strong view, that although his work was representative of the non-mainstream Keynesian approach to economics and especially economic policy was important nevertheless, has been confirmed time and time again as evidenced in the fortunes of the UK, US and Eurozone economies. His writings, reflecting the sharpness of his mind and intellectual integrity, have had a considerable impact on macroeconomics and have aroused the interest of scholars, economic journalists and policymakers in both mainstream and alternative thought. In a review of Wynne’s last book with Marc Lavoie (2007), Lance Taylor had this to say: ‘Wynne’s important contributions are foxy – brilliant innovations… that feed into the architecture of his models’

I also like Wynne’s stand on the current account imbalance of the United States:

Bibow finds that Godley’s diagnosis of the looming economic and financial difficulties ahead of their occurrence was prescient with regard to US domestic developments – a theme that came up in the chapters by Wray and Galbraith. But Bibow takes issue with Wynne’s assessment of the US external balance being unsustainable. He notes that the US investment position and income flows are more or less in balance and he attributes this phenomenon to the safety of the US Treasury securities and the dollar functioning as the reserve currency.

Dimitri then says

Even if this is so, it cannot continue indefinitely, Wynne would have replied.

The conference page is here

Alfred Eichner And Federal Reserve Operating Procedures

Alfred Eichner was a Post-Keynesian economist known for his text Macrodynamics of Advanced Market Economies published 3 years after his death in 1988. He died at the age of 50 in an accident and at the time he was preparing to include an analysis of open economy macroeconomics in his story of how economies work.

This post is about an article/chapter he wrote (with Leonard Forman and Miles Groves)* in 1984 in a book titled Money And Macro Policy edited by Marc Jarsulic. It is a fantastic book with chapters written by Basil Moore and Marc Lavoie as well on the endogeneity of money. I discussed this previously in my post More On Horizontalism.

Google Books allows a preview of the chapter and embedding it on a webpage and I have done so at the end of this post. If it doesn’t appear properly in your browser, please let me know. Else, like me, you can buy the book 🙂 Of course G-books won’t allow a preview of all pages due to copyright restrictions.

Eichner’s chapter (#2) is titled The Demand Curve For Money Further Considered. 

The authors start off the description with

First, the amount of bank reserves, and thus the monetary base, is not the exogenously determined variable assumed in both orthodox Keynesian and monetarist models but instead depends on the level of nominal income. This is because the central bank, in order to maintain the liquidity of the financial system, is forced to purchase government securities in the open market so as to accommodate, at least in part, the need for additional credit as the pace of economic activity quickens. With the amount of unborrowed bank reserves, and thus the monetary base, to a significant extent endogenously determined, it follows that the money supply is, to no less an extent endogenously determined as well. It is therefore a misspecification to assume that the money stock, or any of its components, is entirely exogenous, subject to the control of the monetary authorities, and then to derive a demand curve for money based on that assumption. In reality, the demand for and supply of “money” are interdependent, with no possibility in practice of being able to distinguish between the two.

Second, it is the demand for credit rather than the demand for money which is the necessary starting point for analyzing the role played by monetary factors in determining the level of real economic activity…

The authors then point out the neutralizing nature of open-market operations of the Fed. Usually this – open market operations – is presented in textbooks and in some old Federal Reserve publications as causing the amount of reserves to rise and allowing banks to increase the supply of reserves. Eichner had earlier worked with data and failed to see open market operations increasing the amount of reserves in practice. He realized that the open market operations neutralize flows:

… Thus, in the face of a fluctuating public demand for currency, flows of gold into and out of the country, variations in the amount of deposits held at the Fed by foreigners and others, changes in the amount of float and fluctuations in the Treasury’s cash holdings, the Fed must engage in open-market operations just to maintain bank reserves at a given level. This is the neutralizing component of a fully accommodating policy, and it is one reason why it is difficult in practice to relate change in bank reserves to open market operations …

What is so nice about the quote above is that Eichner knew exactly what factors affect reserve balances. At the time, “float” may have been more important than it is today. Eichner not only knew that the Treasury’s account at the Fed affects reserve balances but also holdings of other institutions such as foreign central banks – i.e., as a result of “flows of funds into or out of the Federal Reserve System” in his own words. (In the same paragraph from which the quote is taken).

Further the article goes:

An increase in the demand for credit will, to the extent it is satisfied, lead to an increase in bank deposits (especially demand deposits). This is because banks make loans by simply crediting the borrower’s account at the bank with the funds advanced. The increase in deposits will, however, require that banks maintain larger reserves at the Fed. Thus required reserves, ResR, will increase and, unless the Fed acts through the purchase of government securities in the open market to provide banks with the necessary additional reserves, banks will find themselves with insufficient reserves to meet their legal requirements… the Fed is forced to accommodate, at least in part,  whatever demand for credit may manifest itself.

The terminology “accommodating” was later made clear later by Eichner in his book Macrodynamics as operations aimed at pegging the short term interest rate whatever the economic or credit conditions. So when the Fed is not accommodating – in this terminology – it means it is pursuing a policy of raising rates at frequent intervals with an aim to impact credit and aggregate demand.

The Google Books link is embedded below.

click to view on Google Books

Endnote

*Chief Economist and Economic Analyst, respectively at The New York Times at the time of writing.